Harold W. Attridge, ed. The Religion and Science Debate: Why Does It Continue? (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 221 Pps., $45.00; and Edwin H.-C. Hung, Beyond Kuhn: Scientific Explanation, Theory Structure, Incommensurability, and Physical Necessity (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), xv + 146 Pps., $110.00.
Both of these titles currently under review deal with the same issue, although from different perspectives, and in different manners, with one explicitly addressing it and the other implicitly doing so. The edited volume by Attridge asks, largely, why the debate continues between science and religion, and the book by Hung addresses scientific explanation in particular; however, both titles address the issue of explanation broadly considered, and thus are reviewed together in what follows. It will be argued that the science and religion dialogue continues because it has yet to fully address the main issue of the dialogue: how to formulate an adequate explanatory paradigm between the two disciplines.
Harold W. Attridge is the Dean and Lillian Claus Professor of New Testament at the Yale Divinity School. In his edited volume, he brings together six essays from leading scholars to address if the tensions between science and religion have changed during the past – roughly – one hundred years since America endured the Scopes trial (covering the debate over teaching evolution in public schools). This book, which marks the one hundredth anniversary of The Terry Lecture Series at Yale University, brings two scientists (Kenneth R. Miller and Lawrence M. Krauss), a philosopher (Alvin Plantinga), two historians (Ronald L. Numbers and Keith Thomson), and a sociologist (Robert Wuthnow) to address the issue from its philosophical roots to its manifestations within American culture.
Keith Thomson opens the edited volume, addressing such issues as Intelligent Design Theory (IDT), whether evolution is good science, what limits there may be (if any) of the evolutionary paradigm, and if religion should be dealt with in public schools. Notably, he contends that the most dangerous thing about evolution may be its ability to explain away the possibility of belief in God; however, he defends the notion that a ‘deist’ can continue to believe in a supreme being is the original creative power behind the universe (11–12). Both Krauss and Miller, in their later contributions, covering IDT and the posit of science vs. religion, respectively, add credence to Thomson’s assertion. In his contribution, Numbers astutely acknowledges that there existed no ‘conflict’ – properly so-called – between science and religion prior to the publication of Draper’s History of the Conflict Between Science and Religion in 1874 (32). Accepting the premise that there is a ‘conflict’ between science and religion in his essay, Plantinga clarifies the source of the conflict and states that the scientific version of Darwinism – as opposed to the naturalistically-influenced position of unguided Darwinism – is compatible with theistic belief (116). Closing the volume, Wuthnow avers that any difficulty between the teaching – and acceptance – of science and religion is due to the discussion being narrowly defined as an either/or relation (176–77), and not a both/and relation. The contributors of this volume take important steps toward creating an environment that reconciles scientific inquiry with the human spirit, and collectively offer a unique perspective for the debate between science and religion in America.
Edwin H.-C. Hung teaches philosophy at the University of Waikato, New Zealand. In this title, he addresses Thomas Kuhn’s celebrated work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, which revolutionized thinking in the philosophy of science, essentially replacing logical positivism and the philosophy of Karl Popper. However, this book also goes beyond Kuhn by explicating the non-deductive notion of ‘paradigm shift’ in terms of the new concept of representational space. This going beyond of Kuhn is critically important, as it allows Hung to a unitary theory that solves the five central problems in the philosophy of science: scientific explanation, the structure of scientific theories, incommensurability, scientific change and physical necessity. Notably, the book identifies the main task of science as representing reality, which makes the connection with our first book herein reviewed clear, as the reality of the world is consistent with the reality of God; it also makes clear the importance of explanation in science, his coverage of which will constitute the remainder of this review.
In the course of his text, Hung develops Kuhn’s paradigm view of science in such a way that interprets (read ‘explains’) science as a rational and objective study of nature. After a short introduction to Kuhn and the classical view of science, Hung shows why there is need of a new logic of explanation, building from Kuhn. The three subsequent chapters develop his idea of conceptual theories by explicating them with reference to categories (chapter 3), his proposed revision of Kuhn’s notion of paradigm shifts – i.e. the concept of representational spaces (chapter 4), and with reference to languages (chapter 5). Chapter six addresses the paradox of incommensurability, whereas chapters seven and eight cover the growth of scientific explanations (and their change) and the idea of physical necessities, respectively. The ninth chapter closes the text with a constructive proposal that contends variegated sensory experiences can be explained adequately by seemingly incommensurable theories.
In sum, then, what is the connection between these seemingly disparate titles? I contend that the view that Hung proffers, in reference to science exclusively, is of value to the ongoing discussion between science and religion; particularly, the inculcation of his logic of projective explanations – i.e. that science explains reality through the replacement of theory paradigms (ref. Kuhn) as well as through deduction from empirical data – may well aid those who work in this dialogue to see that our positions are propositional attitude statements rather than descriptions of reality per se, be they with respect to religion or science. So then, if we are to adhere to the currently popular (although diminishingly lower) conception of a confliction (or worse: ‘war’) between science and religion, it is nevertheless possible for seemingly incommensurable theories of explanation to projectively explain the same phenomena.
Bradford McCall
Regent University, Virginia Beach, VA