Christopher Southgate, The Groaning of Creation: God, Evolution, and the Problem of Evil (London: Westminster John Knox, 2008).
- I will note that I originally reviewed this title in 2008, but for some reason Dr. Patrick Madigan at Heythrop Journal did not publish it until 2015. Why this transpired, I know not.
I did not realize that you were originally trained in biochemistry. I like how in this title, you take the issue that has vexed theologians since the dawn of Christianity: i.e., the problem of evil (or theodicy). Your unique perspective on this topic offers much to me with regard to possible future dialogue. And if I were fortunate enough to study under you, I could see myself building from your seminal insights in this text. I, for example, could see myself building off of your delineation of ethical kenosis as consisting of three parts: that is, of aspirational kenosis; appetitive kenosis; and “acquisitional” kenosis. Indeed, I appreciate how you highlight that kenosis is not merely a self-emptying, but also a self—giving (102). This aligns with my conceptioning of kenosis, and would also correlate well with Oord’s uncontrolling love of God thesis. I appreciate how you admit that the God espoused by Judeo-Christian belief could be both praised and questioned when viewed honestly, especially with respect to the bountiful wastefulness of an evolving creation (and with it, the extinction of 98% of all entities). I gain much from your exploration of many models of the triune God in relation to non-human creation, and what that means for humans in relation to the same entities.
I resonate with your description of the nature and extent of the problem for theodicy involved in the suffering and extinction that evolution by natural selection necessarily entails. As you note, Darwin’s Origin showed the problem of suffering to be one that has stricken millions of creatures over the course of millions of years, with groanings that are innumerable. (Nature is truly red in tooth and claw). You are insistent on the fact that this ‘groaning’ may be the only way by which the ‘exalted’ objects of the present natural world, objects that were called “good” by a good God, could have arisen (2). That is, it is a “package deal”. I resonate with your contention that the terming of creation as ‘good’ may reflect a functional definition, one that highlights a propensity to give rise to great beauty, diversity, and complexity (15). I could easily see myself expanding this idea, especially with reference to my continual dialogue within the theology & scence debate.
I agree with you that the various theories that you outline in Chapter two– e.g. Intelligent Design and Creationism –stand in the way of actually engaging the debate of theodicy. I too regard the “Fall” as a mythical occurrence, a truth that is expressed in mythical terms, and that we should not contend that the “Fall” is responsible for the evil present in nature. Like you too, I similarly affirm that some natural ‘evils’ are an inherent part of the natural order and are in fact required for higher forms of life, especially with respect to its beauty and diversity, to have arisen via Darwinian natural selection. You highlight your sympathies in the third chapter with the contention that good can only develop in nature through processes that include the risk of suffering, a contention that I similarly resonate with (48).
Your discussion of kenosis in the fourth chapter, which is a key motif, highlights the ide that this kenotic God has actually entered into the web of creation, with all its potential suffering and pain, in and through the life and death of Jesus. You then make a transition in chapter five that builds on this theology of creation and redemption with a consideration of the eschatological recompense to animals (of sorts) for suffering in the present era. In fact, you contend that not only shall humanity be present in the afterlife, but also shall other animals. I agree. This is the only way, in my opinion, to give justice to the trials that non-humans animals have experienced in this dispensation.
In sum, you note that whereas pain, suffering, and extinction are intrinsic to the evolutionary process, the world is still to be conceived of as ‘good’. Your highlighting throughout of the ‘ambiguity’ present in nature is something I could build upon as well. For example, I could foresee myself inquiring as to why a ‘good’ God chose to create through the means of evolution.