The Disfigured Face: Traditional Natural Law and Its Encounter with Modernity

Luis Cortest, The Disfigured Face: Traditional Natural Law and Its Encounter with Modernity (New York: Fordham Press, 2008), xvii + 136 Pps., $55.00.

Luis Cortest is Associate Professor of Spanish and Director of Medieval and Renaissance Studies at the University of Oklahoma. In this title, he makes a significant contribution to the study of natural law, especially regarding its relation to the Thomistic tradition. It chronicles the forming of natural law theory from Thomas himself, through the Neo-Thomists of the sixteenth century, its encounter with secular philosophy, and its ultimate survival as attested to by numerous papal encyclicals, beginning in the late nineteenth century and continuing to the present day.

Cortest notes that for Thomas, natural law constitutes the first principles of practical reason (xi). In fact, the reason why one may refer to justice in the normal sense at all is because nature and morality conform to an immutable ontological order (chapter one), insomuch as nature itself is a reflection of the order of ‘being’ (for Thomas, existence is the most basic principle of reality). So then, for Thomas, the author whose conception of natural law forms the foundation for this book, the ontological and ethical orders are not autonomous but inseparable – in effect, his ethical system is an ontological morality (chapter two). Cortest highlights the links between the Middle Ages and Renaissance views on natural law, with particular emphasis being placed on the influential role of Francisco Suárez (chapters one and three). He contends that without Suárez, natural law theory would have been exceedingly malformed, for he was the most influential philosopher in the Thomisitic tradition for some time.

Moreover, he traces the development of natural law theory through the seventeenth century and indicates that by that time, it had assumed a new meaning, one that dealt with the discerning moral principles. In the modern period, Cortest shows how traditional natural law was transformed by thinkers like John Locke and Kant (chapter four), who both approached nature more empirically, into a doctrine compatible with early modern notions of general moral principles.

Beginning with Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical of 1888, Thomistic thought once again reasserted itself in philosophy and religious thinking (chapter five). Leo was convinced that Thomas’ principles could provide guidelines for Christians ion their pursuit of solutions to problems even centuries after Thomas’ death. In keeping with Thomas, Leo strongly defended the notion that all law and freedom came from God, and not mankind. Cortest tracks the survival of the tradition such names as Mercier and Maritain in chapter six, highlighting their recovery of Thomistic views on natural law.

A central argument in this book is that the traditional notion of natural law has almost disappeared from ethical and moral discourse in our (post)modern age. For Thomas, the ethical (or practical wisdom) must be understood as an extension of the metaphysical (or speculative wisdom). Most (post)modern philosophers, in contrast, consider these orders to be separate. Moreover, for Thomas, humanity is led to God by his/her nature because we were created in the image of God (100). Furthermore, for Thomas, the relation between God and humanity is not merely one of creator and creature, but is of an ontological status instead, as humanity participates with God (ibid.). Rather than attempt to make the traditional doctrine compatible with modern rights theory, Cortest argues that traditional natural law must be understood as a form of pre-Enlightenment ontological morality that has weathered the onslaught of modernity, although with a disfigured face.

All in all, I was challenged and energized by this book. I found it to be a challenging read, however, as it seems that Cortest did not guide his readers very well in the text, especially in tying up the ends of the argument as he progressed through each chapter. This lack, though noticeable, does not detract from the immensity of value to be gained from this book by scholars with interests in the Thomistic philosophy.

Bradford McCall, Regent University, Virginia Beach, VA