Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro, Naturalism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), viii +132 Pps., $16.00.
Arising from the Centre of Theology and Philosophy at the University of Nottingham, Interventions is an interdisciplinary series of books that seek to cover crucial concepts and key figures in contemporary thought. The series does not seek to accommodate Christian thought to the prevailing philosophy of the era, but seek instead to perform tactical interventions in popular debates that problematizes the accepted terms of the debate, injecting ‘life’ into them. The series offers an alternative to both scientism and nihilism, avoiding the conjunctive approach toward the concepts (i.e. religion and science, theology and science, etc.), opting instead to picture the relationship between the two subjects as ‘moments within a distended theological performance’ (series introduction). This inaugural Interventions volume introduces readers to the now dominant scientific worldview referred to as naturalism. Stewart Goetz (Professor of Philosophy, Ursinus College) and Charles Taliaferro (Professor of Philosophy, St. Olaf College) examine naturalism philosophically, evaluating its strengths and weaknesses. Whereas most other books on naturalism are written for professional philosophers by professional philosophers, this book is aimed primarily at a college-educated audience that possesses interest in learning about this pervasive worldview.
In five short chapters, the authors introduce and assess some of the leading forms of naturalism that are at the center of contemporary philosophy. After sketching some of their bedrock assumptions, the authors outline, broadly, the various competing schools of naturalism, highlighting the influence that this worldview has on current conceptions of human nature, human values, and the world. The object of the authors in this book is not simply to examine the implications of naturalism, but also to consider the impact of a thorough-going naturalistic worldview has on a religious conception of reality (4). The author’s goal in this short book is to display both the promise and the perils of contemporary naturalism. They take into account the different definitions of naturalism, and settle on a rough definition that naturalism is the philosophy that stipulates that everything which exists is a part of nature, and hence there is no reality beyond or outside of nature (6).
Within chapter one, entitled ‘The Challenge of Strict Naturalism’, the authors note that it is the prevailing thought of naturalism that all things are ultimately reducible to, and explainable by, physics. This form of naturalism has radical implications to common views of nature itself and human nature. The authors contend that the goal of strict naturalism is to take the beliefs, desires, experiences, and choices that appear to be representative of intelligent life are thoroughly explainable by terms that are nonmental, nonconscious, and nonpsychological. They note that this view of naturalism excludes, a priori, any sort of teleological explanations in nature, human or otherwise, as well as excluding libertarian free will (16–17).
The authors argue in chapter two, aptly titled ‘Strict Naturalism versus a Natural View of Persons’, that the ideal conceptioning of modern naturalism faces insurmountable problems in that it cannot describe or undermine the experiences of pleasure and pain, or the existence of persons. In this chapter, the authors look more closely at the reasons behind strict naturalism, as well as some of the challenges it faces. In so doing, they argue that the principle reason for the advocacy of strict naturalism is the proverbial mantra of causal closure within the physical world (26). They demonstrate that the thesis of causal closure is at odds with the natural understanding of ourselves as genuine agents, and also is philosophically dubious (44). Chapter three takes a turn from theory and assesses how the prevalent view of naturalism deals with what philosophers like Plato and Descartes refer to as the human soul. Therein, they note that all forms of naturalism deny any form of dualism in persons, that is, that person are physical entities with a nonphysical part within them as well. They contend that the cogency of naturalism can be measured to the extent that it can show a nonnaturalist dualist view of people to be mistaken.
Worth the price of the book alone is chapter four, ‘Naturalism, Consciousness, and Values’, wherein the authors address broader conceptions of naturalism, ones that allow humans to be marked by awareness of subjective experiences and feelings of value (71). These broad naturalists concede that humanity is more than physics, chemistry, and biology, but dogmatically deny appeals to any force beyond the natural world (excluding, then, a transcendent God by inference). The authors challenge the (almost) unquestioned supremacy of naturalism in chapter five. In said chapter, they argue that naturalism’s rejection of theism is not vindicated by the evidence of science. They conclude that there is absolutely nothing antiscientific about the way humans generally describe themselves as conscious subjects that possess genuine free will.
In my humble opinion, if this title from the Interventions series is indicative of things to come, we scholars who are interested in the mutually beneficial dialogue between science and theology (to use conjunctive language) will benefit much from it. For those of us who have taken college courses in the sciences and have thereby been proverbially pummeled by strict naturalism, this challenge to the status quo shall be a welcome breath of ‘fresh air’. As such, I recommend this book to all interested patrons without hesitation.
Bradford McCall
Regent University, Virginia Beach, VA