James A. Keller, Problems of Evil and the Power of God, Ashgate Philosophy of Religion Series (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), x + 176 Pps., $99.95.
The problem of evil (theodicy) has vexed commentators of the Judeo-Christian faith for literally millennia, and a virtual plethora of books have been written about it. So what need is there for another title addressing the same old questions like ‘Why do bad things happen to good people?’, ‘Why isn’t God’s existence more apparent to humanity?’, and ‘If some miraculous events occur for some people, why not for others?’? James A. Keller (Professor of Philosophy, Wofford College) seeks to address these well-worn questions from a distinctly Process theology perspective, which may be the first of its kind (at least that I am knowledgeable of), and thereby offers new avenues to approach these problems of evil – suffering, divine hiddenness, and unfairness. It is largely focused upon presenting a different idea of God’s power, one that potentially better accounts for, and relates, to the problem of evil.
The book is arranged in the following manner: an introduction, followed by seven chapters, with an attendant bibliography and index. Chapter two, three, and four cover the problems of evil mentioned above. In each of these, Keller summarizes and evaluates what traditional theists have said regarding these problems. More specifically, chapter two, in explicating the traditional responses to theodicy, notes that they have attempted to show that the presence of evil in the world is not logically inconsistent with an omnipotent, all-knowing God, and that their existence does not render the plausibility of this type of God at least irrational and at most inconceivable (7–9). He ultimately finds these traditional positions to be inadequate. Chapter three discusses the hidden aspect of the divine, as traditionally posited in Western theology, and notes that this conceptioning also raises manifold problems. After all, if God desires for humans to do God’s will, why is it not more clearly expressed to us? He concludes that the only – potentially – cogent response to this problem is that it is perhaps possible that God’s relationship with the world is such that God cannot manipulate its details to make the information about Godself clearer to humanity (50). In chapter four, Keller argues that miracles are – ironically – intrinsically linked to the problem of evil. After all, if miracles occur, the insufficient evidence of their occurrence and the infrequency with which they are alleged to occur, constitute problems in reference to the purported omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence of the Judeo-Christian Godhead. In so doing, he affirms the verity of Hume’s analysis of miracles, as well as laying out the idea that the apparent arbitrariness of purported miracles is unjust (59).
Chapter five transitions somewhat to address the common response of theists to the problems of evil, colloquially referred to as the ignorance defense, and he concludes that although there is some truth and utility in its usage, it is intrinsically of little value. Chapter six discusses revelation, and he contends that we have little reason to believe that we have any bonafide cases of ‘revealed truth’ in terms of propositions in Scripture, especially as it regards the position of God’s omnipotence, an assertion that is bound to disturb traditional theists. For example, he stipulates that it is not clear that the alleged revelation is actually a revelation, as well as that it is not clear what is allegedly revealed (94–95). He opts instead for a communication model as the most promising approach to interpreting the bible (97). He makes a good case that omnipotence is not attested in the Scriptures as being a characteristic of the Godhead in seventh chapter, despite the arguments presented in its favor based on the perfection of God, the belief that God is the creator of all things, miracles, and beliefs about what God will do to (eventually) overcome evil.
The eighth chapter could be considered the pinnacle of the book, as it introduces readers to Keller’s answer to his foregoing analysis: Process theism. Therein he contends that it offers a better solution to the problems of evil spoken of in chapters two through four, as well as the exploration of the lack of clearly defined, propositional truth claims as elaborated upon in chapters six and seven. He also notes herein that Process theism offers a legitimate understanding of God’s power that fulfills the aspirations of those wanting to defend God’s omnipotence, God’s omniscience, and God’s omnibenevolence, thus picturing a Godhead worthy of worship and one that is amenable to an evolutionary understanding of the universe.
Keller argues that as long as God is believed to be all-powerful, there are no adequate answers to the problem(s) of evil, nor is it sufficient for theists to simply claim that our inability to resolve these problems is due to human ignorance. Arguing that there are no good grounds for the belief that God is all-powerful, Keller instead defends the understanding of God and God’s power found in Process theism and shows how it makes possible an adequate solution to the problem(s) of evil while providing a concept of God that is religiously adequate. He brings together in one book a response based on Process theism to human suffering, divine hiddenness, and the apparent unfairness of intermittent miracles, thus constituting a comprehensive response to the problem(s) of evil. It argues three main points: 1) that traditional theodicy’s have serious problems associated with them (chapters 2-5); 2) that God is not omnipotent (chapters 6 & 7); and that Process theism offers a cogent response to the problem(s) of evil (chapter 8). Although probably not the definitive answer to theodicy, for those patrons whose interests lie in either Process thought or theodicy, this book should be a welcome addition to one’s library.
Bradford McCall, Regent University, Virginia Beach, VA.