Julian Dodd, An Identity Theory of Truth (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), xi + 200 Pps., $29.95.
‘What is truth?’, Pilate asked Jesus. Some questions never get answered, it seems. Julian Dodd, who lectures in philosophy at the University of Manchester, UK, addresses this question in the title under review. His previous publications include Musical Works: An Essay in Ontology (OUP, 2007) and, with Helen Beebee, Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate (OUP, 2005).
Correspondence theories of truth, aptly titled, argue that the relation between thought and fact is correspondence, and that facts act as truth makers. Dodd, in countering this assertion, stipulates that the relation between thought and fact is one of identity. The first part of this book seeks to uncover the substantial doctrine held by correspondence theorists, and how it to be inadequate, if not incoherent. Chapter one claims that correspondence theories of truth are based on a truth-making principle that lacks motivation. Dodd sets forth his argument regarding an ontology thoughts in chapter two, noting that propositions indeed do exist, which chapter three then builds upon by noting the nature of propositions is that they are composed of thoughts and not states of affairs, which are in turn ultimately derived from the senses (50).
Chapter four argues that facts are thoughts insomuch as when a thought is true, it is a fact. As a result, he argues that two things that correspondence theorists claim correspond to one another are in fact identical (109). He argues in chapter five that facts are not complexes of worldly entities which make thoughts true; they are merely true thoughts. As such, the supposed truth-maker is the truth-bearer (111). The resulting modest identity theory of truth, distinguished from a robust identity theory only with respect to its conceptions of facts, allows for a defensible deflation of the concept of truth, he argues in the sixth chapter. The final chapter serves to distinguish the modest identity theory of truth from its other identity theory competitors, and argues that the modest version avoids the problems that other identity theories of truth possess.
While acknowledging that his modest identity theory of truth neither provides a definition of truth as per se, nor an account of what truth consists in, Dodd does claim that it diagnoses the failure of correspondence theories. This book, though short, is not to be taken lightly; it is dense reading. However, for the graduate student who perseveres, it will be rewarding, if not in producing a convert, nonetheless in sharpening one’s take on correspondence theories of truth. As such, I recommend it for philosophy students with interests in Wittgenstein, Salmon, and Austin.
Bradford McCall, Regent University, Virginia Beach, VA.