Jacob Klapwijk, Purpose in the Living World? Creation and Emergent Evolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), ix +311 Pps., $24.99; Luca Illetterati and Francesca Michelini, eds. Purposiveness: Teleology Between Nature and Mind (Piscataway, NJ: Transaction Books, 2008), 223 Pps., $39.95.
Our first volume under review is written by Jacob Klapwijk, who is Professor Emeritus of the Department of Philosophy, Free University, Amsterdam. In this title, Klapwijk considers whether there is an intrinsic impasse between the notions of teleology and Darwinian evolution. He notes that there seemingly is a choice between religious notions concerning the origins of life and the contemporary findings of evolutionary science; however, he rejects this idea, and offers an alternative to both and an attempt to bridge the gap between them, via the idea of ’emergent evolution’.
In chapter one, he addresses the question of whether the evolution of life is exclusively a matter of chance or is better understood as including the notion of purpose. The second chapter analyzes creationism and its new manifestation known as intelligent design (mainly Dembski’s version) from an Augustinian perspective; he dismisses the various attempts to reinvigorate creationism as inadequate and deficient, although done from a noble desire. Chapter three sets Darwin, neo-Darwinism and naturalism in their contexts, viewing each from a claim to continuity. Chapter four explores the differentiation between the scientific theory of evolution and the ideology of what he calls evolutionary naturalism, while the fifth chapter lays out the support for natural selection. The sixth chapter transitions toward the focus of the book in examining the emergence theories of Morgan and Alexander, which then leads to a description of what emergent evolution is exactly in chapter seven. Chapter eight furthers this conceptioning of emergent evolution, with Klapwijk attempting to formulate a general theory of it. The ninth chapter applies the insights developed theretofore to the philosophy of mind. Chapters ten through fourteen apply the ideas and legacy of Augustinian thinking to evolutionary science, and all affirm that Darwinian science does not automatically exclude the possibility of purposiveness and directionality in nature.
In sum, Klapwijk bridges the gap between creationism and evolutionary science, giving a balanced analysis of the claims of evolution theory and the biblical message concerning the origins of life. Writing from an Augustinian point of view, he criticizes creationism and intelligent design theory as well as reductive naturalism. He offers an alternative to both and an attempt to bridge the gap between them, via the idea of ‘emergent evolution’. In this theory the process of evolution has an innovative character, which results in a living world of a massive amount of complexity. Are evolution and creation irreconcilably opposed? Klapwijk’s answer is emphatically ‘no’! In contrast, he asserts that the two can complement one another.
The second volume under review arose from an interaction of two research programs: one financed by the University of Padua, entitled ‘Natural Items and Artifacts: an Historical-Philosophical Analysis’, directed by Luca Illetterati, and a second one financed by the Bruno Kessler Foundation – Center for Religious Studies of Trento, entitled ‘The Future of Human Nature’, directed by Paolo Costa, Tristana Dini, and Francesca Michelini. Since the rise of Darwinian biology, teleological discourses have been banished and made bankrupt as explanatory tools in biological investigations. The various contributions to this volume set out whether it is possible to talk of purposes in nature, without requiring some intentional agent for those purported purposes. The editors note that teleonomy is meant to be an alternative to an argument for an intelligent designer, as well as to the contention of those who aim to eliminate teleology from biological inquiry altogether; they find such a re-terming of teleology to be useless, and prefer to call it what is in truth. In practice, they note, biology frequently refers to teleological terminology, so it is wise to simply call it what is: purposes.
Virtually every essay in this volume (eight of nine) approaches the notion of teleology from a Kantian perspective, and even dialogues with Kant in the course of their argumentation. The legitimacy of the Kantian notion known as ‘internal teleology’ is addressed throughout, together with the idea of teleonomy. The essays corporately argue that there needs to be a recovery of the Kantian distinction between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ purposiveness, and assert that (post)modern critiques of teleology are effective at refuting ‘external’ purposiveness only. In what remains, several aspects of individual contributions shall be commented upon. Notably, Costa, Predrag Sustar, and Cord Friebe address the Kantian framework regarding purposiveness, either highlighting it potentiality or critiquing its legitimacy for biology. Illetterati and Georg Toepfer take the Kantian distinction between internal and external purposiveness as the starting point for explaining the difference between products of nature and products of human intention, arguing that the two categories of purposiveness can differentiate between the two. Andreas Weber and Francisco Varela contribute an essay that identifies the anticipation of the idea of autopoiesis in Kant.
I find it heartening that both of these books affirm both teleology and methodological naturalism. Collectively, they show that whereas the assault on teleology from modern thought might have been pronounced, the study teleology is still alive and well in the contemporary era; it simply will not go away. And in this reviewer’s opinion, for good reason.
Bradford McCall, Regent University, Virginia Beach, VA.