I must admit my general amazement of 20th century theology that I have garnered as a consequence of perusing Grenz and Olson’s book entitled 20th Century Theology. I found the descriptive method regarding the creative tension between transcendence and immanence to be most illuminating. Indeed, it opened my eyes to a theretofore unperceived dynamic in theology. It was illuminating in that it aptly described the viewpoints of a large portion of the precursors to 20th century theologians, as well as those who arose in the 20th century. One can see, as a result of said authors’ analyses, a ‘see-saw’ type swing between the polarities of immanence and transcendence regarding our conception of God’s placement and interaction within this world.
However, having enumerated this book’s impressive strengths, I will go onward now to display (or at least attempt to) 20th Century Theology’s weakness(es). First, I contend that Grenz and Olson unwarrantedly classify various theologians within a system of details that perhaps does not adequately espouse their view. In particular, I will address how this errant classification applies to existentialists as a whole, and to one Rudolph Bultmann as the exemplar of existentialism. Additionally, it is my contention that Grenz and Olson improperly limit the view of God’s interaction with the world to a dichotomous (either/or) and exclusionary methodology, and therefore do not allow for a sort of synthesis or even a third option (specifically a Thomistic view).
As aforementioned, it is this reviewer’s deduction that Grenz and Olson improperly categorized Rudolph Bultmann as representative of the over-reactive ‘swing’ back toward transcendence in the early 20th century. In contrast, this reviewer contends that Bultmann’s existentialism ‘swallowed’ his projection of God being transcendent as an object of our adoration, and instead made God into a wholly immanent creature for our manipulation. Grenz and Olson were right in contending that Bultmann’s main objection to liberal theology is that the God it posits is not God at all, but simply a deified human. So then, Grenz and Olson are also right in stating that the failure of liberal theology led Bultmann to conclude that God is not an object that can be known (i.e. God is “Wholly Other”). However, Grenz and Olson are entirely wrong in classifying Bultmann as an essential instrument in the revolt against immanence (cite chapter 3).
Indeed, Bultmann does posit that the God of Jesus Christ was “wholly other”, but Bultmann does not intend this posit to be construed as God being located in a realm outside of human reality. Rather, describing God as “wholly other” allowed Bultmann to establish what he considered an appropriate distance between God and human comprehension. But this conception of God also seemed to preclude any connection at all between God and humanity, which Bultmann admitted as a potential problem.
Bultmann therefore sought a theological concept in which he could retain God’s radical difference from humanity (i.e. Him being “wholly other”) without sacrificing God’s relations with humanity (i.e. immanence). Bultmann saw the need to balance his conception of God as “wholly other” (which could be construed as overly transcendent), so he adapted Martin Heidegger’s existentialism (which could be construed as overly immanent) to fit his own theological purposes. So then, Bultmann asserts that Christian faith is, and should be, comparatively uninterested in the historical Jesus and centered instead on the transcendent Christ and his interaction (i.e. immanent) with humans today.
Bultmann depicts the difference between an existential interpretation and historical interpretation in that in historical interpretation, the text is primary and the reader is secondary, whereas in existential interpretation, the reader is primary and the text is secondary. Bultmann therefore exhorts us to “give up a neutral attitude toward the text, [so that] the question of truth can dominate the exegesis.” In effect, then, according to Bultmann’s position of existential interpretation, the meaning of any text is ultimately reduced to what it means to me (note, then, the overly immanent orientation of God’s self-revelation). Indeed, Bultmann notes that, “Historical exegesis asks: ‘What is said?’ We ask: ‘What is meant?’” Regarding the self-understanding that is the goal of Bultmann’s existentialist interpretation, he says: “God has no real existence apart from the believer or the act of believing,” and, “when the believer speaks of an act of God, he is ipso facto speaking of himself as well” (note the non-dubious immanent aspect of the knowledge of God supposed here).
Bultmann vehemently reacted against the method of historical interpretation in part because he deemed it true that there is no truly objective and entirely neutral exegesis, as everything that we interpret is conditioned by the way in which an exegete interprets himself (note here also the immanent aspect of the potential knowledge of God). By selecting an existential method of exegesis, Bultmann rejects the historical interpretive method due to its tendency to objectify ideas as if theology could be treated as mathematics or physics (i.e. to make it in a sense ‘transcendent’). In existential theology, the Bible is not viewed as a special, original, constitutive, authoritative starting point of truth. Moreover, it is not viewed as standing above (i.e. transcendent) other disciplines so that it first shapes our reflections, but it rather becomes subordinated to immanence-conditioned philosophical presuppositions.
In Bultmann’s theology, the Gospel of God has been absorbed by philosophical presuppositions, and it is thus made bankrupt in that it has no “good news”. Moreover, existential theology is spiritually bankrupt, as it forces people to build upon an immanent conception of God. Being based upon faulty immanence-based presuppositions, the existential theology of Bultmann leaves people groping in their existence and not growing in the grace of the Lord Jesus Christ. Bultmann’s criticism of the New Testament is entirely excessive. By removing the mythical language from his interpretations, Bultmann was able all the more easily to fall back upon the existentialist interpretation (i.e. immanent) that he had already planned to employ. Though his attempt to balance his thinking by asserting God to be ‘wholly other’ than creation (i.e. transcendent) was noble, it nonetheless could not offset the disastrous impacts of his almost purely existential interpretation (i.e. immanent). Bultmann therefore reduced the New Testament to an existentialist interpretation that in turn reduced it to an Immanently Secular Philosophy.
Without doubt, existentialism has flourished in the 20th century. In the 21st century societal context, people need the historical gospel of Jesus Christ—not a message mutilated by existential presuppositions. Existential theology is overly immanent and overtly bankrupt.
As a potential corrective to the either/or postulation presented by Grenz and Olson in this book, it may be wise to explore a Thomistic understanding of God’s existence. As this reviewer understands a Thomistic viewpoint, it would entail viewing God as completely outside of time and space as we humans know it, but simultaneously recognizing that the same God nonetheless acts within both time and space as we know it at His discretion. Perhaps this reviewer can in the future further explore a Thomistic viewpoint of God’s temporality and spatiality as relating to Postmodern theology.