Steve Fuller, Dissent Over Descent: Intelligent Design’s Challenge to Darwinism (Thriplow, Cambridge: ICON Books, 2008), v + 272 Pps., $29.95.
Steve Fuller is professor of sociology at the University of Warwick and a sociologist of science. In this book, the sociologist of science attempts to identify what Intelligent Design (ID) theory is in truth. He notes that it is a scientifically-credentialed creationism (a bold statement, one which I will critique later). He contends that ID theorists tend to reinterpret existing scientific evidence rather than doing original research, and that their long-term goal is to reorganize the sciences so that biology can come to be seen as a ‘design science’. In what follows, a brief overview of the text will be provided, salient points of Fuller’s text will be introduced, and an attendant critique of his book will be administered.
Fuller unabashedly proclaims that an embryonic form of ID theory was the impetus behind the great Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century, and it continues to provide the foundation for doing science in today’s world. A central theme of the book is that it is much easier to justify evolution as a product of the history of science, than to justify science as the product of evolution. Chapter one challenges the assumption that there is a broad consensus of opinion within science regarding the origins of the universe and thereby the origins of life on earth. Chapter two contends that the emergence of science was dependent upon the distinct idea that humans are imago dei, that is, that they are created in the image of God, and therefore are rational and intelligible creatures. In chapter three, Fuller considers the origins and legitimacy of the science-religion conflicts, focusing upon the mediating position of ‘theistic evolution’. He treats such positions as dubious at best, excepting the views of Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, whose views Fuller asserts are worth revisiting today. Chapter four delineates the attempts to caricature the difference between evolution and ID in terms of science versus non-science; he contends that such a caricature is false. Chapters five and six both deal with the history and presence of the design argument in biology, from its seventeenth century theological science of theodicy, to its twentieth century manifestation in information theory and molecular biology, the latter of which now is the centerpiece in the Neo-Darwinian synthesis. Fuller attempts to display how certain modern scientific developments associated with ID have arisen from a position of biblical literalism in chapter seven. Ironically, in the epilogue Fuller, who is a self-proclaimed secular humanist, proposes a general strategy for ID to improve its position within the current evolution debate.
In chapter three, ‘Is There Middle Ground Between Creation and Evolution?’, Fuller maintains that the perceived conflict between science and religion was manufactured in the nineteenth century. Therein, he dismisses ‘theistic evolution’ as an ‘intellectual mirage’ and a feeble compromise between the two worldviews, a position with which I personally disagree. In chapter four, Fuller chides Michael Behe for taking Darwin’s ‘bait’, that is, for attempting to demonstrate that a complex organ existed which could not have possibly been formed by numerous successive modifications. Though I do not think that Behe has provided the requisite organ/system to invalidate Darwin’s theory, it is my opinion that Darwin sincerely believed that an instance of such would invalidate his theory, and thus it was not an example of rhetorical flourish, countering the claims of Fuller (146).
Fuller points out several aspects of modern evolutionary theory that place it, just as much as any posit of ID, on shaky ground scientifically. Indeed, he notes that evolutionary theory has not attained consensus on whether the overall process of evolution is Lamarckian or Darwinian. Moreover, it has not answered whether design is something that genuinely needs to be explained, or merely an illusion to be dispelled. Further, if natural selection is in fact ‘chance-based’, to which theory of chance does it subscribe? These unresolved issues, Fuller advocates, are potential stumbling blocks for the ongoing acceptance of modern evolutionary theory.
Although the book is rich with defensible positions, I was extremely put-off by the description of ID as ‘scientifically-credentialed creationism’, and with Fuller’s lumping together of all who believe there is a creator as ‘creationists’. There are many proponents of macroevolutionary theory, myself being one, who nevertheless contend that there is a God who has at one time – or even now does! – directed the process, and do not appreciate the appellation of ‘creationist’. Moreover, I do not think that Fuller has an adequate grasp of ‘methodological naturalism’, which he contends is truly nothing other than ‘pseudo-philosophy’, fueled by bigotry. Rather, ‘methodological naturalism’ asserts that scientific hypotheses are explained and tested by reference to natural causes and events solely, without reference to ‘forces’ outside of nature. These critiques aside, even if the book does not convince you of Fuller’s views, it is nonetheless a profitable read that will stimulate further discussion and inquiry. I recommend it to those who work or possess interest in the ongoing dialogue of the relationship between science and religion.
Bradford McCall
Regent University, Virginia Beach, VA