David Braddon-Mitchell and Robert Nola, eds. Conceptual Analysis and Philosophical Naturalism (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2009), viii + 370 pps. $38.00.
David Braddon-Mitchell is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Sydney, while Robert Nola is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Auckland. Together, they edit a volume of 14 fine essays that critically evaluate the philosophical methodology and analysis now known as the ‘Canberra Plan’. The project to which this edited volume has its origin in Frank Ramsey’s 1990 essay entitled ‘Theories’. The 14 essays are broken into three different parts, addressing issues in mind, metaphysics, and normativity, with the bulk of the essays to be found in part one. In what follows, select essays from this volume shall be highlighted so as to give one a primer of what many be found herein.
Braddon-Mitchell leads off the volume with an essay that sets the tone for the remainder of the essays in part one, all 7 of which deal with the application of the Canberra Plan to issues related to philosophy of mind, semantics, concepts, and the Plan’s a priori character. Indeed, in ‘Naturalistic Analysis and the A Priori’, Braddon-Mitchell considers ways in which the distinction between O-terms and T-terms was initially drawn by the logical positivists; notably, he considers their distinction to be a failure, and as a result their analyses based upon the distinction are also failures. Frank Jackson contributes a chapter in which he discusses physicalism, defending the notion that what makes the world physical is that it only contains physical things, the aggregations of which a priori entail that a certain pattern is instantiated. Fred Kroon builds on the argument of Jackson, and in so doing contends that the Canberra Plan is actually a family of distinct doctrines, united by a confidence in a broadly physicalist worldview and the ability of a priori philosophizing to support the data derived in reality.
The 4 essays found in part two address matters related to metaphysics in relation to the Canberra Plan. In one of his last papers prior to his death – one in which is only available in this volume – David Lewis writes about ‘Ramseyan Humility’; herein, Lewis argues that one whereas there is only one final instantiation of a theory, there are nevertheless many possible realizations of any one theory, and it is impossible to predict which of the possible realizations of the theory will be the actual realization of the theory. Lewis contends that Ramseyan Humility is our irredeemable ignorance about the identities of the actual fundamental properties that realize a final theory. Picking up the earlier emphases upon physicalism, Philip Pettit endorses a version of it that says that there is an a priori entailment from the ways things are physically to the way things are in other respects, be it psychological or social.
Part three includes 2 essays, both of which raise matters concerning normativity in relation to the Canberra Plan. Notably, Mark Colyvan in his contribution considers how the normativity of rationality can be naturalized, and thereafter ponders problems raised by the Canberra Plan with relation to the normativity of ethics. The greatest contribution of Colyvan is, however, that his naturalistic account of normativity is not viciously circular.
This volume will be welcomed by patrons who have interests in the school of thought that led to, and has been bred from, the Canberra Plan. The excellent introduction allows for readers to be introduced to the terminology used in the volume, and truly makes the work accessible to non-experts. Anyone with interests in a priori knowledge, metaphysics, and normativity should definitely purchase this fine volume.
Bradford McCall
Regent University, Virginia Beach, VA