basis of rational scientific comprehension
of
the issues at stake. But for those with the
background,
the book is fascinating
and
compelling. Moreover, the style of the writ-
ing gives no hint that the English version is
a translation. The book is clearly written by
someone intimately acquainted with the sci-
ence of molecular biology and the personal-
ities involved. Notes and bibliography, inci-
dentally, take up virtually a quarter of the
pagination.
Morange also states that he
wanted to write a history that is as complete
as possible – a laudable aim. but whether
such an aim can be realized, as Morange
implicitly admits when describing the sheer
mass of documentation available, is another
question.
‘Ambitious’ is how his attempt is
described on the dust cover.
I
would question whether the accidental
demonstration
by Eduard Buchner of cell-
free fermentation
by yeast juice in 1897 can
really be described as the first biochemical
experiment.
It was more of a breakthrough
in previously unsuccessful attempts. That it
was critical in opening up the possibility of
learning the details of the pathway of gly-
colysis is not at issue. I particularly enjoyed
the chapter headed The French School, and
was fascinated to learn how Jacques Monod
chose
to
change
the
name
‘adaptive
enzyme’ to ‘inducible enzyme’ for quasi-
political
reasons – namely to indicate that
his research was not to be seen as support
for neo-lamarckian
concepts or the Soviet
version promoted by Lysenko. ‘Monod thus
spectacularly
crowned his break with the
French Communist Party, which had called
on intellectuals
and scientists to support the
new Soviet theories.’ This chapter is fol-
lowed by a particularly fascinating one enti-
tled ‘Normal Science’ – a period of consoli-
dation after a major advance, then, amongst
others,
there
Engineering,
are
chapters
on
Genetic
Split Genes and Splicing, and
A New Molecular Biology.
Morange concludes his Introduction with
the words ‘Whatever the value of the inter-
pretations
put forward here, this book and
the historical
information
it
contains
will
enable others to take us further in the under-
standing of the molecular revolution in biol-
ogy’. I wholeheartedly
agree: the book is
indeed a work of scholarship,
which, in
addition to outlining the history of an excit-
ing period in the development
of biology,
includes much thought provoking comment.
K. Manchester
Nature’s Purposes: Analyses of Function
and Design in Biology
edited by C. Allen, M. Bekoff and
G. Lauder
MIT Press, 1998.
c23.95 paperback (vi + 597 pages)
ISBN 0 262 5 1097 9
The philosophy of science aims to under-
stand the products of the scientists’ labours,
166
Endeavour Vol. 22(4) 1998
asking questions about the form and content
of scientific theories, the ways in which sci-
entists
relate their ideas to empirical evi-
dence, and the differences
that are to be
found between sciences of different areas.
One of the perennial and most fascinating
questions for the student of the life sciences
centers in on the question of teleology. If
one looks at the physical sciences, at least
since the Scientific Revolution in the 16th
and 17th centuries, one finds lots of talk
about causation and so forth, but never does
one
find
talk
about
things
happening
because of future events or states. As far as
the physical scientist is concerned, such talk –
functional talk, or as it is known techni-
cally, ‘teleological’ talk – is to be confined
to cases where one has human or (possibly
higher animal) consciousness
and intention.
It makes good sense, for instance, to ask for
what end an instrument is designed? But it
makes no sense whatsoever to ask for what
end (say) does a planet, or mountain, or
mineral exist? It may be that we humans can
use a particular mineral in a certain way for
our ends, but the mineral itself has no future
reference or purpose.
Things, however, are different when we
turn to the biological sciences. Here we find
that teleological
language runs rife, even in
the absence of conscious intention. Whereas
no physicist
would ask what purpose a
falling
ball serves (other than in a con-
sciously designed mechanism), a biologist
quite happily talks in terms of the eyes serv-
ing the function of sight, or the heart serving
the function of blood circulation, or the fins
on the back of the Stegosaurus serving the
function of heat regulation (or mate attrac-
tion or predator defense). Fascinatingly, not
only is such teleological
language to be
found amongst ‘old-fashioned’
biologists
like systematists
and biogeographers,
but it
is also to be found at the cutting edge of
molecular biology. In fact, in many respects
the molecular biologists use such teleologi-
cal language even more than the paleon-
tologists, asking for instance about the func-
tion of the genetic code and the end which it
serves – not to mention questions about the
purposes of all the various cellular compo-
nents,
as they are triggered by the DNA
molecule,
finally
producing
the
finished
organism or phenotype.
Why is teleology acceptable in the bio-
logical
sciences
sciences?
but not in the physical
A great deal of ink has been
spilled
on this question, and the volume
under review – a collection put together by
a philosopher
(Colin Allen) and two biolo-
gists (Marc Bekoff and George Lauder) –
contains many of the most informative and
justly celebrated discussions of the past two
or more decades. There are a number of
approaches
which have been taken to the
problem of teleology, and they are all repre-
sented – as are their critics – ip this volume.
Two approaches, in particular, stand out for
special attention. On the one hand, there are
those who at one level or another have been
much influenced by various kinds of goal-
0160-9327/98/$19.00 –
directed or feedback mechanisms, particu-
larly of the kind which were developed dur-
ing the Second World War – an example
being missile seekers, which can regulate
their behaviour according to the goal or tar-
get against which they are launched. Here
there is a kind of flexibility, or adaptability,
where an object seems in some sense to be
controlled by, or a function of, a future state,
namely the achievement of the goal – in the
case of a missile seeker, by the blowing up
of the target. Many have argued that here we
have a model or paradigm which can serve
as a key to biological teleological
under-
standing.
Perhaps in the biological world
what we have is some form of goal-directed
system, or set of systems. A prime example
would be a body shivering and sweating in
order to achieve the end or aim of a certain
constant temperature. The teleology comes
directly
from the fact that we are making
reference to such a system. In logic, there is
no reason why such language should not be
used in the physical sciences – it is just that
there, there are no such naturally occurring
goal-directed
systems.
On the other hand, with respect to the
problem of teleology, we have the approach
of
those
directness
who argue that although goal
captures some important notion
in biology, namely that of adaptability, it is
by no means the case that teleology is con-
fined to, or even primarily about, such phe-
nomena. It is argued that most cases of tele-
ology are unlike sweating and shivering
(although these are coincidentally teleologi-
cal systems): rather, teleology is essentially
to do with the fact that here one is dealing
with biological adaptations. That is to say,
one is dealing in teleological
cases with
characteristics
which are directed, or aimed
towards, the end of survival and reproduc-
tion. The claim by those who favour this
kind of analysis is, to use Richard Dawkins’
well-chosen
phrase,
that teleological
lan-
guage identifies places where we find, not
‘a conscious
intelligence,
that is to say a
conscious watchmaker, but rather the work-
ings of an unconscious
process,
the
so-
called blind watchmaker’. What is argued is
that natural selection, the chief mechanism
of evolutionary
biological
about design-like
effects
change, brings
which mimic or
otherwise are analogous to the design-like
effects
of
conscious
metaphorically
intelligence.
Hence,
as it were, we transfer our
teleological
thinking
from the conscious
world to the unconscious world of natural
selection.
(Teleology
of
course
can be
applied to brains, but the teleology occurs
not
because
of
the
consciousness,
but
because brains serve the ends of survival
and reproduction.)
In both of the above analyses of biological
teleology, the philosophical
aim is to elimi-
nate or explain the strangeness and seeming
weirdness of the language. No-one today, at
least
no-one
today in science, likes the
thought of straightforward
teleology – that
there is a conscious being designing and
controlling
the world – or even worse that
see front matter 0 1996 Elsevier Science. All right reserved.
the future reference of teleological language
(the eye exists now in order to see in the
future) refers somehow to causes operating
in the future and controlling
the present.
The reason why there is dislike of the sup-
position of a grand designer is not so much
because biologists necessarily want to deny
the
existence
some
do,
of
most
this
designer
notoriously
(although
Richard
Dawkins), but because it is felt that in mod-
em science reference
to
supernatural
entities
is
theological
or
simply inappropri-
ate. Analogously,
it is felt that reference to
future causes or some such things are like-
wise unfortunate: apart from anything else,
there are classic difficulties raised by such
conundrums as the so-called ‘missing goal
object’. If the present is being controlled by
the future, what happens if the future never
obtains? If, for instance, the fins on the back
of the Stegosaurus exist to attract a mate,
what happens if an asteroid destroys the
Stegosaurus before it gets round to meeting
such a mate? Are we then to say that the fins
existed for a non-existent
object or event?
Surely not!
Both
of
approaches
the
modem
to teleology,
philosophical
the goal-directed
approach, and the adaptationist approach –
both of which avoid God-talk and escape
missing goal object problems – are repre-
sented in Nature’s Purposes. They are pre-
sented, argued about, discussed, critiqued,
and then reformulated and presented again.
This, I suppose, is the way of philosophers.
Whether there are any final answers, I will
have to leave as an exercise to the reader.
However, I will point out that today there is
a significant
minority of think~s, both bi-
ologists and philosophers,
who wonder if in
major respects the whole teleological analy-
sis is not mistaken. Certainly Stephen Jay
Gould and his associates and followers deny
strongly that the organic world is anything
like
as functional
or
teleological
as has
often been assumed. Gould argues that, far
from everything being adaptive, we ought to
introduce another notion, that of exaptation,
which
will
cover
many aspects of the
organic world which are not anything like as
functionally
tight
or adapted as common
opinion will have it. This is not to say that
the problem of teleology is now eliminated,
but that perhaps it is nothing like as impor-
tant as many have thought. More than this,
that by concentrating
on the question of
teleology
to the extent that we have, we
have distorted
our understanding
of
the
organic world.
As readers of this journal will know,
Gould’s are fighting words here as else-
where. Many feel that he is pushing a par-
ticular ideologically
influenced view of the
biological
world in order to promote his
own non-darwinian
ends. I will draw no
absolute conclusions, simply noting that oil
is been poured on an already burning fire,
and that mere are heated discussions occur-
ring in this area. If you fear – as did Dr
Johnson before you – that philosophy is a
boring subject, and that it is impossible to
0160-9327/96/$19.00 –
do it unless one shuts off all human emo-
tions, then let me offer this volume as an
anecdote.
You will find that discussions
about the nature of science can in their way
be as lively and controversial as fascinating
as discussions
and controversies
within sci-
ence itself. The editors of Nature’s Purposes
are to be congratulated on presenting a bal-
anced and fascinating overview of one of
the
most significant
philosophical
about the nature of the life sciences.
issues
M. Ruse
Astronomy Through the Ages: The Story
of the Human Attempt to Understand
the Universe
by Robert Wilson
Taylor & Francis, 1997.
f19.95 hardback (xv + 302 pages)
ISBN 0 74840748 0
Writing
a
history
of
begins in pre-classical
astronomy
antiquity
which
and ends
with Stephen Hawking inevitably demands
a high level of selectivity – especially when
working within 279 pages of main text. Yet
while Astronomy Through the Ages is well
written, with a commendable
clarity when
dealing
with the explanation
of
physical
phenomena, I could not help feeling a sense
of imbalance when it came to what might be
called the historical allocation of the book.
Although the text is broken down into three
sections – ‘Early Developments’,
‘The Era
of the Telescope’ and ‘Modem Astronomy’,
comprising
some
13 chapters
and
an
‘Epilogue’ – around 170 of these pages are
in fact occupied by the achievements of the
past hundred years or so.
The book is very strong on 20th-century
physics and astronomy, and for this I com-
mend Professor Wilson. It is also very
thorough when dealing with those selected
topics within the broader history of physical
astronomy which it covers; of these, the sec-
tion on the life and work of Johannes Kepler
is especially well handled.
However, there are omissions. In a work
so pre-eminently
concerned with the ances-
try of modem astronomy and cosmology, I
was puzzled to find figures of the standing
of Edmond Halley and Sir William Herschel
effectively
relegated
while
Lord
astronomer
Rosse
to
passing
remarks,
(who was the first
to detect a spiral structure in
galactic bodies) fails to appear at all. Yet
these three men defined the problems of
deep-space
cosmology
between
1716 and
1850. Sir William Huggins and the 19th-
century
spectroscopists
are likewise only
alluded to briefly. The reason for this, no
doubt, is that Astronomy Through the Ages
is a book about astronomical ideas and con-
cepts, rather than about the techniques of
research.
Even so, I am surprised at the
book’s lack of any real discussion of those
crucial
instrumental
which astronomical
see front matter 0 1996 Elsevier Science. All right reserved.
innovations
discovery
upon
has hinged,
from Ptolemy’s armillary spheres to the
Hubble
Space
Telescope.
Although
Wilson’s interests lie in the development of
our ideas about the nature of the universe,
some
discussion
about
ought to be unavoidable,
instrumentation
for
it
is
only
through observing and measuring the heav-
ens with instruments that refine the com-
mon perceptions of our natural faculties that
we have learned anything meaningful about
the sky. We are told that Kepler’s Laws
would not have been possible without the
superior
quality of Tycho Brahe’s obser-
vations,
yet there is no mention of the
instruments
which
observations
possible,
made these superior
nor any explanation
of why Tycho’s observations
were better
than Ptolemy’s. The same passing-over of
the crucial role played by instruments in
constantly
redefining
and then advancing
physical concepts is evident throughout the
book. While it is true that an instrument or
technique might be mentioned with relation
to an astronomical idea, the vital connection
between the instrument and the evolution of
the concept is never explored. The section
entitled
‘The Era of the Telescope’, for
instance,
specific
goes into very little detail about
telescopic
discoveries,
made them possible,
beyond
Galileo.
But what I did particularly
and what
those
enjoy
of
in
Wilson’s book was his attempt to relate
astronomical ideas to the wider cultural and
religious tenets of the ages from which they
came. This is very important for a truly his-
torical
understanding
of
any science, for
cultures with radically different concepts of
nature from those which we have today will
interpret celestial phenomena in very differ-
ent ways. One should not, for instance, be
too hard upon the people of the medieval
Christian centuries for seeing the heavens as
static and unchanging, rather than thinking
of them as a research area in which new
knowledge
could
European
be
exploration
found.
Medieval
was concentrated
upon aspects of the Divine, and upon
mankind’s relationship to it, rather than on
what we would now recognize as physical
nature; and one should be careful not to
evaluate the intellectual energy of a culture
simply on the basis of the amount of scien-
tific discovery which it produced.
Allan Chapman
The Gospel of Germs: Men, Women and
the Microbe in American Life
by N. Tomes
Harvard University Press, 1998.
c19.95 hardback (xv + 351 pages)
ISBN 0 674 35707 8
Why do we endlessly wash, clean and tidy?
To many of us the explanation is obvious:
we do it to avoid germs. If asked, we will
indulge
in
mental gymnastics
to
explain
why a hair in the soup or clothes with ink
Endeavour Vol. 22(4) 1998
167