Coventry Humes Theory of Causation: A Quasi-Realist Interpretation
9/17/07: Coventry, Angela M. Hume’s Theory of Causation: A Quasi-Realist Interpretation (London: Continuum, 2006).
Causation pervades the way we think. Our entire relation to the universe is based upon the notion of causation. The relation, then, of cause and effect, is at every moment on the mind of those who have agency within the world (sentient creatures, i.e.). It is incumbent for philosophers to develop an adequate conception of causation for causation is present within virtually every dimension of philosophy, yet no complete theory has been offered heretofore. Despite the recognized importance of Hume’s view on causation, there is little agreement among commentators regarding the upshot of his theory (Coventry, 3).
Currently, there are two opposing schools of thought re: Hume and causation: causal realists interpretation, and causal anti-realist interpretations (Coventry, 3). And there is both textual evidence for, as well as textual evidence against each of these theories of interpretation. Coventry contends that Hume maintains a position between these two interpretations (Coventry, 4). Coventry contends that Hume offers an explanation of how we end up with the thoughts and sayings of one event necessarily causing another (Coventry, 4).
The purpose of Coventry’s book “is to offer an interpretation of Hume’s theory of causation that is inspired by quasi-realism” (Coventry, 7). According to her interpretation, Hume traces the impression of necessary connection or power between causes and effects to a feeling in the mind, and thereby denies that our discourse about causes implicates the existence of powers or forces linking causes to effects (Coventry, 106). If Coventry’s interpretation is correct, “then Hume thinks that statements about causes are based on psychological mechanisms developed in response to the regularities and not on powers existing in objects” (Coventry, 146). I realize that I am definitely a realist by having read this book by Coventry, note.