Anjan Chakravartty, A Metaphysics for Scientific Realism (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2007), viii + 251 pps. $85.00, 978-0521876490.
Anjan Chakravartty is Associate Professor at the Institute for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology and Department of Philosophy at the University of Toronto. He did an MPhil and PhD in the Department of History and Philosophy of Science at the University of Cambridge (2001). His research focuses on central issues in the philosophy of science, and in particular the question of scientific realism. More pointedly, his interests lie in developing an appropriate metaphysics to underpin a moderate, defensible form of realism. As part of this general project, he is investigating the connections between entity realism, structural realism, and empiricism, the nature of causation, laws of nature, and natural kinds. Within this book, Chakravartty depicts scientific realism as the view that gives approximately true descriptions of both observable and unobservable aspects of the mind-independent world. In so doing, he traces the contemporary evolution of realism by examining recent strategies adopted by its proponents in response to challenges against it by anti-realist skeptics. He asserts that elements of the realist account require certain metaphysical commitments that are crucial for the internal coherence of the position.
The metaphysics of scientific realism raise a host of fascinating issues, and within this volume, Chakravartty examines them. Pointedly, in chapter one, Chakravartty introduces the idea of realism in the context of the sciences, and considers the dialectic between that position and the empiricism that seemingly belies it. In chapter two, Chakravartty develops more fully the sketch of scientific realism and considers its most promising formulations. He notes that realists should commit to theories that are genuinely successful and not merely ad hoc, as well as that realists should commit only to theories that are sufficiently ‘mature’ in their development. The resulting inventory of realist commitments to certain properties, relations, and particulars, is developed in chapter three. Therein, Chakravartty defends his commitment to realism from selective skepticism.
Chapter four is the first in part two of the book, and it examines the issue of causation, an ontological issue, arguing that its role in science is nicely facilitated by a specific understanding of causal phenomena in terms of processes and dispositions. In fact, he notes that one of the most important aspects of the metaphysical foundation to realism is its ideas of causation. His examination of causes in chapter four leads him to consider the laws of nature in chapter five, wherein he argues that the nature of causal properties and the dispositions that they confer lend themselves to a metaphysically minimal account of natural necessity. Chapter six hones in on the role of natural kinds in the realist discourse. Therein, he argues that a proper understanding of natural kinds leads to the dissolution of the dichotomy between objective and subjective classifications, and a rejection of certain tenets of ancient metaphysics that are outmoded in the concept of realism.
Chapter seven presents a shift in his argument in which his previously formed theories meet practicality. This final part of the book addresses several matters that arise from the earlier discussions of the metaphysics and epistemology of realism. Indeed, in chapter seven, Chakravartty examines the use of models to represent parts of the world, as well as whether the ontological nature of scientific theories has any influence on the epistemic commitments of realism. Chapter eight dissects the implications of a realist account of scientific knowledge.
One of the ongoing themes of the book is that some disputes between realists and anti-realists are impossible to be resolved due to the lack of shared assumptions between the two positions. However, by illuminating the connections between realist interpretations of science and the metaphysical foundations for such beliefs, this book offers an engaging and compelling vision of how realism provides a coherent and internally consistent account of scientific knowledge. All in all, this book is to be highly recommended for philosophers of science, as well as for those who are interested in arguing for a realist account of nature. For those looking for proverbial ‘meat’ to buttress their ideas of realism from those who argue for an anti-realist position, a ‘feast’ can be found herein.
Bradford McCall
Regent University, Virginia Beach, VA.