John Hick, The New Frontier of Religion and Science (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), xii +228 Pps., $31.95.
Admittedly, the religion and science dialogue seems to be never ending. There are always new approaches to the relationship between the two, as well as new perspectives on the said relationship. But what are the new frontiers of the relationship? What are the new areas of foci? John Hick contends, within this volume, that the dialogue between the fields should now expand more fully into the frontiers of the neurosciences and consciousness. Hick has herein written the first major response to the possible challenges that neuroscience pose to religion. This book is comprehensive, viewing not only how Christianity is could respond to the neurosciences, but also takes account of eastern forms of religious experience. In so doing, it challenges the prevailing naturalistic assumption of our culture, including the idea that the mind is either identical with or a temporary epiphenomenon of brain activity. Moreover, it discusses religion as the inner experience of the Transcendent, and suggests a form of spirituality for today.
Hick indeed postulates that the frontier of the dialogue is concerning the human brain. Is the ‘mind’ merely a by-product of the functioning brain that underlies it? Hick argues that if this is the case, it has significant implications to religious experience, for it would mean that said religious experience/s is not an authentic awareness of a transcendent entity, but merely a reflection of material events happening in the brain instead. In eighteen chapters, which are divided into three parts, Hick covers such things as religion as human institutions, spirituality and mysticism, mind/brain identity, various current naturalistic theories, free will, and religious pluralism. In what follows, salient points will be noted from Hick’s distinctive contributions within this title.
In chapter one, ‘Religion as Human Institutions’, Hick contends that since the axial period one has been able to distinguish between religion as institution and communal practice, and the inner mystical or experiential dimension of religion, the latter of which is the focus of this book. In chapter three, ‘What Is Religious Experience?’, Hick avers that it refers to any experience, veridical or not, that is structured in terms of religious concepts (27). Therein, Hick introduces the central focus of this book, that is, the religious experience or ‘ordinary’ people, which is mutually dependent upon institutions and personal spirituality (36–37). He asserts that institutions are necessary, but secondary to individual spirituality. But how can one determine if this inner side of religion is authentic or is merely a form of self-delusion? Hick answers in chapter four, that ‘By Their Fruits You Will Know Them’.
In part two, Hick transitions from religious experience in general to its relation to the neurosciences in particular. He contends in chapter five that people involved within this dialogue must be conscious and aware of the naturalistic worldview, as it is composed of heavy emphasis upon materialism. Hick is explicit in stating that an ardent materialism is incompatible with any belief in a transcendent divine reality (57). In this chapter, he concludes that religious experience is not the products of local brain malfunctions (63). Moreover, in chapter seven, he contends that consciousness is not identical with brain activity, and that consciousness does possess authentic executive power (82). In so stipulating, he denies the contention of Penrose (1999) that the micro-physics of the quantum world should be merged with the macro-physics of the observable world, which includes the human brain (89).
In arguably the most important chapter within the text, Hick analyzes current naturalistic theories in chapter eight. He recognizes that within contemporary philosophy of mind discussions, the simple mind/brain identity is has given place to more sophisticated naturalistic theories, which include emergent properties, dual attributes, and functionalism. He notes that all of these theories, however, are different forms of epiphenomenalism (92). The problem with these contentions of epiphenomenalism is that it requires consciousness to be devoid of causal power, which would inhibit it from having any evolutionary advantage (hence it would not be selected for, by inference). After all, if consciousness proffers no behavioral difference, but simply reflects the activity of the brain, it would not contribute any survival value to the early organisms that possessed it (97).
In chapter nine, Hick lays out the alternative possibility to the mind/brain identity, and argues that consciousness does have causal influence on the brain (106). This alternative possibility is that consciousness exists as a non-physical reality in constant interaction with the brain that underlies it. So then, Hick asserts that there is two-way causality between consciousness and the brain, which has direct bearing upon the veracity of free-will, which he affirms in chapter ten.
I am a little disappointed with part three, which broadly relates to pluralism, as it is seemingly disconnected with the first two parts of the book. However, this statement is not meant to belie the import of what one will find within the final seven chapters (only its direct connection with the preceding material instead). All in all, however, I have greatly enjoyed Hick’s exploration of the challenges of the neurosciences to religious experience. In terms of the intended audience, I would recommend this title to graduate students and researchers who have interests in how the cutting-edge philosophies of mind impact religious expressions.
Bradford McCall
Regent University, Virginia Beach, VA