William Hasker, The Triumph of Good Over Evil: Theodicy in the World of Suffering (Strategic Initiatives in Evangelical Theology; Downers Grove: IVP Academic, 2008), 228 Pps., $20.00.
William Hasker (Ph.D., University of Edinburgh) is professor emeritus of philosophy at Huntington College in Huntington, Indiana. His other books include Metaphysics: Constructing a World View; God, Time, and Knowledge; Middle Knowledge: Theory and Applications (edited with David Basinger and Eef Dekker) and Providence, Evil and the Openness of God. This new title “seeks to provide a justifying reason for the existence of the evil in the world” (20). He here explores a full range of issues concerning the problem of evil (theodicy), and shows why the evil existent in the world does not provide evidence of a moral fault in God, the world’s creator and governor. This is an important assertion, for theologians must attempt to rectify the existence of an omnipotent, wholly good God with the existence of evil.
The first chapter explains the nature of the problem of evil, and details various strategies of how to deal with it. As such, it gives the grounds for the debate that follows, and sketches a version of Christian theism. The second, “Does Auschwitz Change Everything?,” takes a look at the Holocaust primarily, and other acts of incomprehensible evil secondarily, in order to assert that even in view of such monstrosities, the love and justice of God is still intact in society. In so doing, he evaluates John Roth and D. Z. Phillips approaches to God and evil, and finds both of them lacking. In chapter three, Hasker debunks the notion that the presence of God and evil are logically incompatible with one another, using Plantinga’s classic argument as his source.
In the fourth chapter, Hasker turns to creation in order to ask what a doctrine of it might say about the relation of God with evil. Interestingly, he herein notes that there are three available options for orthodox views on God’s foreknowledge: 1) theological determinism (as highlighted in hyper-Calvinism and neo-Thomism); 2) middle knowledge (as derived from Molinism); and an openness view (as highlighted in Open Theism), and he ‘openly’ promotes the later (he is no friend of middle knowledge theory!). Moreover, he interacts with the arguments of Leibniz, Rowe, and Adams regarding the nature of this world. He suggests that God does not dictate a particular possible ‘world’ but instead chooses a world ‘type’, which allows for the process of cosmic evolution to insert its own proverbial input on how the world turns out, which is a manifestation of grace and generosity (100).
Hasker develops a theodicy of evil in chapter five, examining whether the world is ‘cruel’. This fifth chapter constitutes the longest chapter, and provides Hasker’s most lasting contributions, in my opinion. In it, he gives various reasons why God – a maximally excellent entity – would bring into existence a world such as the one we inhabit, one filled with disease, disorder, and disarray. Here Hasker interacts with Dembski, Morris, and Polkinghorne, before positing a response that is heavily dependent upon van Inwagen. He suggests several ‘structural features’ of the universe that are desireable in a divinely created world, and shows how these attributes are represented in our world. He explains how these features, though desirable, also invariably create a great deal of suffering.
The sixth chapter is a presentation of a free-will theodicy of moral evil, highlighting the inherent value of choice, which reveals Hasker’s preference for a liberation view of free-will, as well as Hasker’s critique of Plantinga’s theodicy. In the seventh chapter, Hasker responds to the question of “Shouldn’t God Be Doing More?” to prevent the apparently pointless evils that everywhere surround mortals in the twenty-first century. The climax of the title is in the final chapter, number eight, which highlights the already-onset-but-not-yet-consummated victory of God over evil. This last chapter is extremely crucial to the overall content of the title, for as Hasker writes, “a Christian response to the problem of evil should not be focused too exclusively on evil” (10).
In sum, I could see this title being used in philosophy courses that need an introductory text to the problem of evil. Pastors, who often face the need to explain why ‘bad things happen to good people’ (in so many words), also will find this resource valuable. He summarizes the issues of theodicy, both old and new, clearly and poignantly, all the while engaging with current philosophical thoughts regarding the subject in a judicious and fair manner. One minor criticism relates to the rather paltry index; I think Hasker’s goal of an introductory text – of sorts – to the problem of evil would have been better served by a ‘thick’ index of terms, names, and so forth. This reservation aside, I would suggest the purchase of this title.
Bradford McCall, Regent University, Virginia Beach, VA.