The Cambridge Companion to Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding. Newman, Lex, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007. 486 pp. $29.99 ISBN 978-0-521-54225-8
Reviewed by Bradford McCall, Regent University
First published in 1689, Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding is widely recognized as one of the greatest philosophical masterpieces in Western philosophy. The Essay posits an empiricist theory of mind, detailing how all ideas and knowledge arise exclusively from sense experience. It should be noted that Locke was trained in mechanical philosophy and he wrote his Essay to be consistent with the natural science of his day. This Companion volume includes fifteen new essays from leading Lockean scholars, seven of which are written to address topics connected with the first two books of the Essay. Covering the major themes of Locke’s work, the various scholars situate the ideas in the historical context, as well as often clarifying their relationship to the ongoing work of philosophy.
Notably, in chapter one, “The Intellectual Setting and Aims of the Essay,” G.A.J. Rogers details the historical factors that directly influenced Locke, which include Descartes natural philosophy, the method of inquiry promulgated by Francis Bacon, and the traditional teachings of the contemporary universities. Rogers notes that although Locke did not become a Cartesian as a result of reading Descartes, he nonetheless did inculcate some Cartesian language, specifically in regards to ‘ideas’. Moreover, Locke generally accepted, along with Descartes, that intuition lies at the heart of knowledge.
In chapter two, “Locke’s Polemic Against Nativism,” Samuel C. Rickles clarifies the structure of Locke’s anti-innatist arguments and their success. He argues that Locke successfully undermined naïve versions of the innatists’ arguments, and shifted the philosophical burden upon the shoulders of those who held to such an innatist theory of ideas. In fact, Rickles argues that Book I of the Essay was a sustained polemic “to demolish occurrent nativism” (43). More than that, however, Rickles sees the entirety of the Essay as an extended answer to the nativist challenge posited and propounded by Descartes and the Cambridge Platonists. In chapter three, “The Taxonomy of Ideas in Locke’s Essay,” Martha Brandt Bolton clarifies Locke’s classification schemata. She notes that “ideas are the building materials of human understanding,” according to Locke’s theory (67). The purpose of Bolton’s essay is to make apparent the systematic theoretical uses to which Locke puts his taxonomic scheme. She contends that attention to the taxonomy of ideas helps one to gain an understanding of the power of Locke’s overall theory of human cognition.
Chapter five of this volume, “Power in Locke’s Essay,” covers the longest chapter within Locke’s Essay. Within this chapter, Vere Chappel sorts out Locke’s views on power, clarifying its overarching role in Locke’s philosophy, and defends a compatabilist interpretation of Locke’s views on human freedom. Chappel considers, first, Locke’s conceptioning of power; he then sketches Locke’s views of qualities, and then outlines Locke’s accounts of the will and freedom, along with his views on motivation. Chappel notes that for Locke, power consists of two different types: active and passive, with active powers being defined as those which produce change, and passive powers being those that receive change. Accordingly, Locke attributes the possession of active power to God alone.
In an especially important chapter, entitled “Locke on Substance,” Edwin McCann examines four views on the interpretation of what constitutes substance within Lockean thought, and concludes that the traditional view of substance attributed to Locke is the most superior and intellectually cogent. The main points of interpretation that McCann argues for are that Locke believes that humans have an idea of substance that is compatible to the logical tradition, in which there is something in which qualities inhere, and that Locke’s ideas of substance are aimed at combating the Aristotelianism prevalent of his day by advancing the claims of mechanical philosophy.
The editor of this volume, Lex Newman, contributes to the discussion in chapter eleven, entitled, “Locke on Knowledge.” In this chapter, Newman defends the definition of knowledge as the perception of the disagreement or agreement of two ideas. In so doing, Newman explicates the definition of knowledge, explains the two main divisions of knowledge, and addresses potential problems regarding the objectivity of knowledge. He concludes that the texts of Locke do not lend support to the notion that Locke takes sensitive knowledge to involve dual cognized relations in which one is known, and the other is judged.
Taken together, these essays give credence to the notion that Lockean scholarship is alive and well, and they attest to the ongoing relevancy of Locke’s philosophy to our (post)modern world. This volume is directed toward advanced undergraduate and graduate students. Further, it is ideal for use in courses on early modern philosophy, on British empiricism, and on John Locke.