Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989),
Hume writes, “It must certainly be allowed, that nature has kept us at a great distance from all her secrets, and has afforded us only the knowledge of a few superficial qualities of objects; while she conceals from us those powers and principles, on which the influence of these objects entirely depends.”[1]
Hume writes, “As nature has taught us the use of our limbs, without giving us the knowledge of the muscles and nerves, by which they are actuated; so has she implanted in us an instinct, which carries forward the thought in a correspondent course to that which she has established among external objects; though we are ignorant of those powers and forces, on which this regular course and succession of objects totally depends.”[2]
Hume writes, “experience only teaches us, how one event constantly follows another; without instructing us in the secret connexion, which binds them together, and renders them inseparable.”[3]
Strawson defends a Skeptical Realist interpretation of Hume within this book. In fact, he states this book is principally concerned with examining Hume’s realist presuppositions.[4]
Strawson argues that Hume believes in real causal power, and does so not only in common life, but also as a philosopher.[5]
Strawson suggests that it never really occurred to Hume to question real causal power, i.e. that there is and must be something about nature and reality that enables it to be ordered and regular in the way that it is – even in his most skeptical mode.[6] Instead, he was principally concerned with refuting contemporary philosophers who claimed that the causal power could be intelligibly known.
Rather than denying causal power, Hume insists that we have no real grasp of its nature, despite our conviction to the contrary.
Hume, according to Strawson, was not “Humean.”[7] Rather, Strawson argues that Hume is much too good of a philosopher for such an implausible view. Instead of actually being followers of Hume, Strawson stipulates that “Humeans” are really “Brownians”, Thomas Brown. According to Kemp Smith, Thomas Brown was the “first, and outstanding, exponent of the uniformity view of causation.”[8]
ENQ was more representative of Hume’s mature views than the Treatise. In the Treatise, Hume was inclined toward “dramatic overstatement in his polemic.”[9]
The “standard” view of Hume entails causation to be nothing more than regular succession, which Strawson states is a misinterpretation. Strawson indicates that a particularly influential source of the misinterpretation was Ernst Mach’s Science of Mathematics.[10]
Summary of the Argument:
Hume’s strictly non-committal skepticism rules out the assertion that causation in objects is nothing more than regular succession.[11]
Hume’s position is not that true skepticism requires a refusal to accept and belief claim at all.[12]
Hume is insistent to assert the epistemological claim that “nature… conceals from us those powers and principles, on which the influence of… objects entirely depends.”[13] However, he never denies that these powers or principles exist. And although Hume notes that “we are ignorant of those powers and forces, on which this regular course and succession of objects totally depends,”[14] it is nonetheless significant that he admits that they totally depend upon said powers and forces.
Untenability of Regularity Theory:
The Regularity theory of causation represents the view that in nature “one thing just happens after another.”[15] So then, according to Regularity theory of causation, there is a world of external and physical objects that are highly ordered and regular in its behavior.[16]
According to the Realist Regularity theory of causation, the regularity of the world and its behavior is a complete and continuous fluke.[17] Thus, there is no reason for order in the nature of things. Moreover, there is no reason for regularity rather than chaos occurs from moment to moment. The Realist Regularity theory of causation is untenable in asserting categorically that there is no reason for the regularity of the world.[18]
The objection to the Regularity theory is not entirely negative, as one also possesses a positive objection as well: that there is something about the nature of reality that makes it regular, something of which is not merely the fact of its regularity.[19]
Hume could be said to advocate, then, that “causal powers” are “those powers and forces, on which [the] regular… succession of objects totally depends.”[20] This description of causal power(s) allows one “to refer to it while having absolutely no sort of positive conception of its nature.”[21]
As a true and thorough skeptic, “Hume continually stresses the fact that there may exist aspects of reality which are not only unknown by us, but are also unknowable by us, beyond our powers of comprehension, and in that sense utterly unintelligible to us.”[22]
Regularity theorists hold that the world just is regular, and that there is no reason for its regularity.[23]
Causation: chpt 8:
The expression “something like natural necessity” is intended to correspond to the ordinary, strong, essentially non-Regularity-theory idea or conception of causation.[24]
This concept is equally intended by Hume to correspond to what Hume calls “force”, “power”, “energy”, “tie”, or “necessary connexion” in the ENQ.[25]
To believe in causation is simply to believe that there is something fundamental about nature in virtue of which the world is regular in its behavior and that that something is what causation is, or is at least is an essential component of what causation involves.[26] As another positive characterization of what causation is, it may be added that causation involves the notion of one thing deriving from another.[27]
Even considering some interpretations of quantum theory that entail an inherent indeterminacy at the primal levels of nature, one can still claim that there is something fundamental about nature in virtue of which the world is regular in its behavior.[28] Strawson claims that there are “objective, ‘fundamental forces’ governing the behavior of the world”…And [t]hese forces are features of – they are essentially constitutive of – the nature of matter.”[29] These forces are real, mind-independent, observable, and regularity-transcendent facts of nature. According to the Regularity theory of causation, the regularity of the world is a complete fluke. However, according to the causation that is posited by Strawson, it is a metaphysical fact that it is in the nature of things to be regular.[30] In dialog with Strawson, I assert that the world cannot but be regular in the way that it is, given its nature and the fundamental forces that underlie it.
Hume’s Strict Skepticism: chpt 9:
Given his non-committal skepticism, Hume cannot assert that there is no such thing as causation. Beliefs, after all, are not untenable in view of strict skepticism, as they could very well be true, but we simply cannot know them to be true. “[S]cepticism consists precisely in the fact that there is something there to be known which [we are] not in a position to know.”[31]
In the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, Philo (who is Hume’s main representative in the Dialogues) says,
“For aught we can know a priori, Matter may contain the Source or Spring of order originally, within itself… there is no more Difficulty in conceiving, that the several Elements, from an internal unknown Cause, may fall into the most exquisite Arrangement, than to conceive that their Ideas, in the great, universal Mind, from a like internal, unknown Cause, may fall into that Arrangement. The equal Possibility of both of these Supposition is allow’d.”[32]
Philo later queries within the Dialogues, “[h]ow could things have been as they are, were there not an original, inherent Principle of Order somewhere, in Thought or in Matter”?[33] Hume seemingly advocates, then, that there is some sort of causation in the external world and in reality, though we cannot know anything of its nature.[34] This assertion belies the standard Humean view that there is no causation in reality, and that all that exists instead is nothing but regular succession.
As Hume says “It is universally allowed, that nothing exists without a cause of its existence, and that chance, when strictly examined, is a mere negative word, and means not any real power, which has any where, a being in nature.”[35] (at least, that is, now that the world is up and running). Rather, Hume merely stipulates that there is no logical contradiction in the idea that something might be able to arise without a cause.
Causation in the Treatise: chpt 14:
“Hume believes in causation, period.”[36]
Contra Strawson, who claims that “Hume does not hold anything like the strong Regularity theory of causation in the Treatise,”[37] I deem it true that Hume was a Regularity theorist in the Treatise, though he had changed his position on causation prior to the writing of the Enquiry. Indeed, Hume writes, “[t]he only conclusion we can draw from the existence of one thing to that of another, is by means of the relation of cause and effect, which shews, that there is a connexion betwixt them, and that the existence of one is dependent on that of the other. The idea of this relation is deriv’d from past experience, by which we find, that two beings are constantly conjoin’d together, and are always present at once to the mind.”[38] Moreover, Hume also writes in the Treatise, “the constant conjunction of objects constitutes the very essence of cause and effect.”[39] Another citation that refutes Strawson’s assertion is found on page 173 of the Treatise: “the constant conjunction of objects determines their causation” (emphasis in original).
Causation in the Enquiry: chpt 16:
Hume writes that nature “conceals from us those powers and principles, on which the influence of… objects entirely depends… It is allowed on all hands, that there is no known connexion between the sensible qualities and the secret powers [of bodies].”[40]
Moreover, regular succession is not all there is to causation in external objects, as regular succession in external objects “totally depends” on the existence of certain powers or forces which are distinct from it and which give rise to it.[41]
Hume seemingly holds that the nature of real causation is always undiscoverable by us, for detection of it would make us capable of a priori inferences about causal matters.[42] Besides, “experience only teaches us, how one event constantly follows another; without instructing us in the secret connexion, which binds them together, and renders them inseparable.”[43] Whereas this statement was written by Hume explicitly in reference to the will over the body, it has a general application. This notion, Hume claims, provides “a… certain proof, that the power, by which this whole operation is performed… is, to the last degree, mysterious and unintelligible.”[44] Similarly, Hume writes that “the power or energy by [animal motion] is effected, like that in other natural events, is unknown and inconceivable.”[45] Note, however, that it still exists, even though we do not have “any acquaintance with the nature of cause and effect.”[46] So then, Hume does not question that there is in fact causation, although he is passionate in his asseverations that we can know nothing of its nature. In speaking of cause and effect, Hume notes that “[o]ur thoughts and enquiries are… , every moment, employed about this relation: Yet so imperfect are the ideas which we form concerning it, that it is impossible to give any just definition of cause, except what is drawn from something extraneous and foreign to it.”[47]
A Summary of Hume’s Argument: Chpt 22:
Strawson contends that Hume is certainly making the negative skeptical epistemological claim that we cannot know anything regarding the nature of causation. However, he is certainly not making the non-skeptical, dogmatic, ontological-metaphysical claim that there is no such thing as causation. Rather, Hume takes it for granted that there is such a thing as causation in reality, although we are entirely ignorant of its ultimate nature.[48] To accept the contrary view, according to Strawson, is to assert that the regularity found readily within nature is ontologically, metaphysically, and ultimately a completely chance event from moment to moment.[49]
Genuine causation relations are not the same as, but do entail, regular succession relations.[50]
Hume stipulates that there “is a kind of pre-established harmony between the course of nature and the succession of our ideas; and though the powers and forces, by which the former is governed, be wholly unknown to us; yet our thoughts and conceptions have still, we find, gone on in the same train with the other works of nature.”[51]
The “standard” Humean view confuses Hume’s epistemological claim that all we can ever know of causation is regular succession with the positive ontological claim that all there is to causation is regular succession.[52]
[1] David Hume, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, in Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd ed revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 32-33.
[2] David Hume, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, in Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd ed revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 55.
[3] David Hume, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, in Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd ed revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 66.
[4] Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 1.
[5] Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 1.
[6] Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 2.
[7] Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 7.
[8] Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume: A Critical Study of its Origins and Central Doctrines. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 91n.
[9] Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 8.
[10] Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 9.
[11] Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 12.
[12] Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 13.
[13] David Hume, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, in Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd ed revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 32-33.
[14] David Hume, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, in Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd ed revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 55.
[15] A. J. Ayer, The Central Questions of Philosophy (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1973), 183.
[16] Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 21.
[17] Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 21.
[18] Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 21.
[19] Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 22, 24.
[20] David Hume, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, in Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd ed revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 55.
[21] Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 52. Emphasis in original.
[22] Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 53.
[23] Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 92.
[24] Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 84.
[25] Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 84.
[26] Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 85.
[27] Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 85.
[28] Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 87.
[29] Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 90-91.
[30] Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 92.
[31] Julia Annas and Jonathon Barnes, The Modes of Scepticism (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1985), 97-98.
[32] Norman Kemp Smith, ed. and trans. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1947), 166.
[33] Norman Kemp Smith, ed. and trans. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1947), 200.
[34] Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 100.
[35] David Hume, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, in Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd ed revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 95.
[36] Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 146.
[37] Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 169.
[38] David Hume, T 1.4.2.47, SBN 212; references abbreviated “SBN” give the corresponding page numbers in the Selby-Bigge/Nidditch version: David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge, 2nd ed., revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978).
[39] T 1.4.5.33, SBN 173.
[40] David Hume, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, in Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd ed revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 33.
[41] David Hume, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, in Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd ed revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 55.
[42] Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 187
[43] David Hume, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, in Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd ed revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 66.
[44] David Hume, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, in Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd ed revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 66.
[45] David Hume, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, in Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd ed revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 66.
[46] David Hume, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, in Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd ed revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 68.
[47] David Hume, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, in Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd ed revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 76.
[48] Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 219.
[49] Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 223.
[50] Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 232.
[51] David Hume, Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, in Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge, 3rd ed revised by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975), 54-55.
[52] Galen Strawson, The Secret Connexion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 277.